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Over the past few years Papua New Guinea
has implemented a series of major political
reforms in the electoral, political party and
parliamentary arenas. In what constitutes an
extremely ambitious attempt to change the
way Papua New Guinea’s political system
works, the broad aim of this process of
political engineering is to strengthen
political parties, promote more broadly
supported candidates and increase political
stability. These three goals find their
institutional expression in several different
pieces of legislation introduced in 2001 and
2002, most notably the Organic Law on
National and Local-Level Government
Elections (OLNLLGE) and the Organic Law
on Integrity of Political Parties and
Candidates (OLIPPAC).1
Some observers have already derided
these reforms as failures. Alphonse Gelu
(2005), for example, has written of the failures
of the Organic Law on the integrity of
political parties and candidates. Bill
Standish has opined that the OLIPPAC and
electoral law changes ‘are likely to have little
impact’ (2005:11). Writing in this journal on
lessons from Fiji for Papua New Guinea, Jon
Fraenkel argued that the parliamentary and
electoral reforms were predicated on
‘exaggerated claims about the institutional
causes of governance failures and naive
expectations that juggling with electoral rules
will transform political culture’ (Fraenkel
2004:130).
In this paper, I argue that if judged
specifically against measurable performance
indicators, rather than the elevated
expectations of cultural change advanced by
some of these critics, Papua New Guinea’s
electoral, party and parliamentary reforms
have in fact already had a discernable
positive impact upon political outcomes.
Assertions to the contrary rely on outlandish
interpretations of reform aims and at times
ignore available evidence. And, as I will
show, testable data to assess the impact of
each of these reforms is readily available.
Background
The OLIPPAC and OLNLLGE laws aim to
promote systemic change across Papua New
Guinea’s party, electoral and parliamentary
systems. In regards to the party system, for
instance, the reform legislation seeks to
encourage greater political consolidation.
Under new rules governing party formation,
composition and funding, all political parties
must be legal organisations with financial
members, a party constitution, and allow
internal competition for party leaders before
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they can be registered. This provision for
party registration is tied to a new system of
party funding, under which each registered
party receives 10,000 kina per member per
year. The intention of these reforms is to move
parties away from being used purely as
vehicles for personal advancement and
encourage intending candidates to stand for
election under a party banner rather than as
independents.
To stabilise Papua New Guinea’s famously
unruly parliament, new restrictions have
also been placed on the freedom of members
to change parties once elected. Politicians
elected with party endorsement must vote
in accordance with their party position on
key parliamentary decisions such as a vote
of confidence in the prime minister, or face a
possible by-election. Prior to the introduction
of these measures, not a single PNG govern-
ment had lasted a full parliamentary term in
office, with most falling via no-confidences
votes as a result of post-election party-
hopping. As a result, these reforms represent
a serious challenge to established political
practice, especially for independents (whose
allegiances have often shifted in return for a
ministerial position or similar inducement).
The final, and possibly most important,
reform in Papua New Guinea has been the
decision to change the electoral system to a
‘limited preferential’ system—a form of the
alternative vote system used in Australia, but
with voters limited to a maximum of three
preferences. Under the new system, if no
candidate has more than 50 per cent of first
preferences (as is likely to be the case in most
seats), the candidate with the lowest number
of first-preference votes is eliminated from
the count, and his or her ballot papers are
transferred according to the preferences
marked. This process continues until one
candidate has a majority, or (as will also be
likely) until there are no more votes to transfer.
The candidate with the greatest number of
votes is then declared the winner.
These various reforms are significant for
several reasons. First, they are the result of a
sustained and clear-eyed analysis of Papua
New Guinea’s political ills. They attempt to
deal with the country’s governance problems
directly, rather than wishing them away.
Second, they are, for the most part, home-
grown institutional innovations which have
been designed and implemented by Papua
New Guineans, not outsiders. Finally, they
are amongst the most ambitious and far-
reaching forms of political engineering I am
aware of, and amongst the most significant
experiments in institutional design to be
implemented in the Asia Pacific region (see
Reilly forthcoming).
In the following sections, I look at the
core objectives informing these various
reforms and attempt to assess the extent to
which these have been met using objective
measures of institutional performance
common in the scholarly literature. In each
case, examination of these performance
measures makes it clear that the electoral,
party, and parliamentary reforms
encapsulated in the OLNLLGE and the
OLIPPAC have already changed political
outcomes in Papua New Guinea.
Electoral reform
The primary aim of the switch from first-past-
the-post to limited preferential voting (LPV)
was to promote the election of more broadly
supported candidates. Other aims included
more peaceful campaigns, promoted by the
need for candidates to win not just their own
tribal block vote, but also votes from other
clans and regions too in order to maximise
their chances of electoral success. As well as
encouraging the election of more broadly
representative candidates, it was hoped that
preferential voting would also encourage
more moderate campaign tactics by making
politicians from different parties reciprocally
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dependent on transfer votes from their
rivals—a supposition strongly supported by
evidence from Papua New Guinea’s three
pre-independence elections, when a similar
system was used (Reilly 2001).
The real test of these aims will come in
2007, at the next national elections. However,
the LPV system has already been partially
tested in 2003 and 2004, in a series of by-
elections for disputed contests from the 2002
national elections. Although these six by-
elections constitute a much smaller sample
than a national election, they include a range
of different regions and contexts, including
Port Moresby, the Sepik, Central Province and
highlands provinces such as Simbu, Enga
and the Western Highlands. They should
thus give a reasonable indication of how LPV
will work across the country as a whole.
As the first PNG elections of any type to
be held under the LPV system, the by-
elections also provide important (if
preliminary) indicators of the new system’s
likely performance. The evidence gleaned
from these by-elections as well as the
abundant historical evidence from the pre-
independence elections provide an
opportunity to assess claims by critics such
as Fraenkel that preferential voting ‘will do
more to modify the style, rather than the
substance, of political campaigning’ and is
‘likely to yield a substantial increase in
invalid voting’ (Fraenkel 2004:130).
First, let us examine the proportion of the
vote needed to win a seat. This has been one
of the major drawbacks of first-past-the-post
elections in Papua New Guinea, where most
winning candidates achieved victory on only
a small minority of the vote. The average
percentage of the vote needed to win a seat
under first-past-the-post voting was down
from 18 per cent at the 1997 elections (Reilly
1999) to an even lower 16 per cent in 2002
(Baker 2005). The 2002 elections, the last to
be held under first-past-the-post rules, saw
only one of the 2,878 candidates gain an
absolute majority, with almost two-thirds of
the parliament elected on less than 20 per
cent of the vote.
In stark contrast, at the six by-elections
held under the new LPV rules, every winning
candidate gained over 50 per cent of the vote,
either outright or following the distribution
of preferences. This is particularly notable
because, unlike in Australia (or Fiji), voters
are limited to a maximum of three preferences,
meaning that there is no guarantee that the
LPV system will deliver winners with an
absolute majority. The percentage of votes
gained by the victorious candidate in each
seat were as follows: Abau Open (50.09);
Angalimp-South Wahgi Open (55.71);
Chimbu Provincial (50.16); Yangoru-Saussia
Open (51.42); Moresby North-east Open
(50.55); Wabag Open (53.19); and Mean
(51.85).
This represents a threefold increase on
the average proportion of the vote obtained
by winning candidates at the 1997 and 2002
national elections. By any interpretation, this
is a dramatic improvement in support levels
for successful candidates under the new
electoral system—a substantive, not stylistic,
change in PNG politics.
What about claims that the new system
will result in a substantial increase in invalid
voting? Again, this is an empirical question
that can be easily tested. At the six LPV by-
elections, invalid vote percentages ranged
from 0.9 per cent in Wabag up to 3.3 per cent
in Moresby North-east. These represent
comparatively low rates of invalid voting—
indeed, they differ little from the invalid
voting rates in the same seats at the 2002
national elections held under first-past-the-
post, despite the greater complexity of the
LPV system (see Standish 2005:13). At the
1997 elections, similarly, invalid voting rates
were on par with the six LPV by-elections,
ranging between zero and 4 per cent across
all electorates (PNG Electoral Commission
1997).
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So, testing the evidence reveals both
predictions—that the new system is unlikely
to impact on electoral outcomes, but is likely to
substantially raise invalid voting—to be false.
Ten years ago, I made a prediction of my
own, arguing that a change to preferential
voting in Papua New Guinea would result
in lower levels of campaign violence (Reilly
1996). This was based on the contention that
such a system could encourage politicians
to campaign for the ‘second-choice’ votes of
electors and provide parties and candidates
with an incentive to make appeals for voter
support across group lines. To attract such
second-level support in Papua New
Guinea’s fragmented, clan-based society,
candidates would need to make cross-ethnic
appeals and demonstrate an ability to
represent groups other than their own.
Numerous examples of this kind of
accommodative behaviour were evident at
Papua New Guinea’s pre-independence
elections, which were held under preferential
voting rules (Reilly 2001). I argued that a
return to preferential voting was thus likely
to lead to lower levels of electoral violence
than was the case under first-past-the-post.
Again, the 2004 by-elections and the new
LPV electoral arrangements provide an
initial opportunity to test this claim. A
detailed study of all six by-elections
conducted by a team of Australian National
University and University of Papua New
Guinea researchers found significantly lower
levels of electoral violence under the limited
preferential system than had been the case
at recent first-past-the-post elections in the
same electorates, where optimal electoral
strategies had often been to coerce, intimidate
or prevent the supporters of rival candidates
from voting at all. Bill Standish, who has
previously questioned whether systemic
electoral reform could arrest this pattern of
‘gunpoint democracy’, concluded that
…these polls have been much less
violent than those in 2002, with much
less tension and coercion in the
campaigning, voting and counting
phases…Was this because of LPV?
Maybe, but also note the strong police
presence and that these are only mid-
term by-elections, and so the stakes are
not as high and the competition (and
election frenzy) is less intense (Standish
2005:6).
While these are sensible caveats, it is clear
that the observed outcome so far has been
more peaceful elections—a conclusion
reached not just by the academic study but
also by the PNG police, who reportedly
‘commended the limited preferential voting
system, saying it brings candidates and
supporters together [and] enables candidates
to move around freely without fear’ (‘Police
report an unusually quiet campaign in
Wabag’, The National 27 September 2004:1).
The available evidence to date thus supports
the contention that changes in electoral rules
has encouraged more peaceful election
campaigns in Papua New Guinea—
precisely because the incentives confronting
candidates and their supporters under the
new system will lead to changes in political
behaviour. But the real test will be the 2007
poll, where both the scale and the stakes of
the elections will be much higher.
Political party reforms
The political party reforms encapsulated
within the OLIPPAC are perhaps the most
ambitious aspect of the legislation. They seek
to enhance the stability of Papua New
Guinea’s parliament by strengthening
parliamentary parties, encouraging
independent MPs to join these parties once
elected, rewarding parties that put forward
female candidates, and encouraging smaller
parties to merge together. The overall aim is
to promote the emergence of a more
consolidated and less fragmented party
system. Again, these objectives have been
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criticised by observers such as Fraenkel, who
argued that the party formation rules ‘are
likely to be more damaging’ than the electoral
reforms and ‘are likely to attract increasing
intervention by the country’s high courts in
the political process, and consequently to
weaken the separation of powers’ (Fraenkel
2004:130).
Again, rather than speculating, the
success or otherwise of the political party
reforms to date can be tested empirically by
examining the structure of Papua New
Guinea’s pre-reform and post-reform party
system. The simplest performance measure of
all is to see whether the numbers of political
parties has changed since the party reforms
were implemented. Here, again, the trend is
clear: the number of registered parties has
fallen sharply since the OLIPPAC reforms
were introduced, from 42 in 2001 to 15 in 2004
(Sepoe 2005:3). However, as a primary aim of
the OLIPPAC reforms was to encourage
erstwhile independent candidates to join
political parties, looking at raw party numbers
is not the best way to measure the impact of
the new arrangements, as the whole point of
the reforms was to encourage the formation of
meaningful parties in the first place.
More appropriate performance indicators
would include the extent to which
independents have joined established parties,
the number of female candidates put forward
by parties, and the extent to which party
mergers have occurred, in comparison to the
pre-reform period. Again, while the longer-
term pattern will not be evident for some time,
initial trends on most of these measures have
been positive. For instance, there has been a
sharp decline in the number of independent
candidates elected to parliament, from 36 in
at the first sitting of the 1997 parliament to 17
in 2002. In addition, most of these 17
independents then chose to join established
parties so that by 2005 there were only two
independents MPs in the PNG parliament.
Similarly, the number of parliamentary parties
declined from 22 at the first sitting of the 2002
parliament to 15 in 2004 as a result of inter-
party mergers, at least some of which appeared
to be reactions to the incentives for party
aggregation inherent in the new laws (Baker
2005:108).
On this evidence, the revised institutional
incentives for party formation, and for
independent candidates to join established
political parties once elected, have played a
modest but positive role in consolidating the
Papua New Guinea party system. Despite the
seemingly inexorable increase in political
fragmentation observed at successive
elections prior to the OLIPPAC’s enactment,
the overall number of parties represented in
the current Papua New Guinea parliament is
lower than it was a decade ago, as is the
number of independents. While it is clear that
considerable energy has also been put into
finding a way around the party discipline
requirements (party splits, for example, have
provided one means of circumventing the new
laws), they do appear to have acted as a
restraint upon further party fractionalisation.
Once again, the only reasonable
conclusion to be gleaned from examining
these basic indicators of party system change
is that the OLIPPAC reforms have played a
positive role in promoting the consolidation
of the PNG party system. While a number of
studies have found that underlying political
practices in Papua New Guinea remain
essentially unchanged, the data suggests that
political outcomes are, nonetheless, being
affected. As Louise Baker has observed in a
thorough and often critical analysis of the
initial workings of the OLIPPAC,
…the reforms have had some success
in strengthening the party system
through its requirement that parties be
registered…The OLIPPAC’s require-
ment for compulsory registration has
brought formality and coherence to
what were previously chaotic, loose
arrangements (Baker 2005:108).
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Finally, the new laws also provide
financial incentives for parties to put forward
female candidates at election time. While the
dismal proportion of women elected has not
improved (one in Papua New Guinea’s
current parliament compared to two in the
previous parliament), the most appropriate
test of this aspect of the reform legislation
would be to look at the number of female
candidates nominated by parties, and
compare this to previous years. Unfortunately,
this data is not readily available at the time of
writing. However, this information would
presumably be relatively easy to assess given
access to the full list of candidates at the 1997
and 2002 elections.
Political stability
The overarching goal of the OLIPPAC
reforms was to increase political stability in
Papua New Guinea. In order to evaluate their
success in achieving this objective, we need
a means of assessing how ‘stable’
governments have been in both the pre-
reform and post-reform periods. While there
are several ways of interpreting this oft-
stated objective, for many years a standard
political science approach to measuring
political stability has focused on the
composition and longevity of executive
governments (Taylor and Herman 1971).
Under this approach, political and policy
continuity depend significantly on executive
durability. Thus, politics is more ‘stable’
when governments are long-lasting in terms
of both time and personnel; conversely,
executives are ‘unstable’ if their composition
alters frequently, particularly if governments
change between elections due to no-
confidence votes, impeachment, party swaps
or similar events.
The simplest means of measuring political
stability in Papua New Guinea is thus to look
at the continuity of governments and the
Table 1 Changes of Prime Minister in Papua New Guinea, 1975–2002
Prime Minister Start date Months in office Reason for change
Somare 16 September 1975 23 Independence
Somare 9 August 1977 31 Somare retains Prime
Ministership
after general election
Chan 13 March 1980 29 No-confidence vote
Somare 2 August 1982 39 General election
Wingti 21 November 1985 21 No-confidence vote
Wingti 5 August 1987 11 Wingti retains Prime
Ministership
after general election
Namaliu 8 July 1988 48 No-confidence vote
Wingti 17 July 1992 25 General election
Chan 31 August 1994 35 Judicial decision
Skate 22 July 1997 24 General election
Morauta 14 July 1999 37 Skate’s resignation
Pre-reform average 29
Somare 5 August 2002 44 (at April 2006) General election
Post-reform average 40+
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length of their tenure in office. As is well
known, PNG administrations have
historically been very short-lived, with
changes of government on the floor of
parliament due to no-confidence votes a
standard feature of PNG parliamentary
politics. Table 1 details the duration and the
changes of Prime Minister in Papua New
Guinea to date, and the reasons for the
change in each case. Because it ignores the
frequent changes to the partisan composition
of governing coalitions in Papua New
Guinea, measuring government tenure in this
way significantly understates the real level
of executive instability. Nonetheless, the
average tenure of PNG governments on this
measure in the period from independence
until the passage of the OLIPPAC reforms
stands at just 29 months.
The pattern since the introduction of the
OLIPPAC reforms has been markedly different.
The first government installed after the
OLIPPPAC laws were introduced, headed by
Sir Michael Somare, has not been overthrown
on the floor of parliament, despite numerous
predictions that this would occur. It is, at the
time of writing, the longest-lasting elected
government in Papua New Guinea’s history.
Its 44-month unbroken term in office at April
2006 was already markedly higher than the
average duration of all its predecessors. As
well as being Papua New Guinea’s longest
serving leader, Somare appears set to become
the first prime minister since independence
to govern for a full parliamentary term. Were
this to happen, as appears increasingly likely,
it would mark potentially the most important
change of all. If stable executive government
can become institutionalised in Papua New
Guinea, there will be profound consequences
for the ability of incumbents to focus on
policymaking rather than the numbers game,
and thus to make credible commitments, and
implement and deliver effective policy.
Conclusion
The party, electoral and parliamentary
reforms instituted in Papua New Guinea in
recent years are not a panacea. While
institutional crafting can help nudge
outcomes in particular directions, large-scale
changes to political behaviour in any polity
are mostly the result of changes in actors’
preferences and the underlying political
culture, not the institutional environment
they work within. Papua New Guinea is no
different to anywhere else in this regard.
Nonetheless, well-crafted institutions can
make a difference, not just because they
constitute the rules of the political game, but
also because they condition the incentives
for political behaviour. And, as readers of this
journal know only too well, people respond
to incentives.
Despite cries from some observers for
‘more neutral and facilitative constitutional
arrangements’ in Papua New Guinea and
elsewhere (Fraenkel 2004:130), the reality is
that political institutions are never neutral.
All institutional arrangements advantage
some kinds of organisations and disadvantage
others, just as they all privilege particular
political strategies while constraining others.
The challenge facing young democracies
such as Papua New Guinea is thus to develop
those institutions which are likely to engender
and institutionalise desirable models of
political organisation and behaviour.
The evidence of this paper is that the
political reforms undertaken in Papua New
Guinea in recent years have, on balance,
played precisely this kind of role. In
particular, clear improvements in political
stability, party system cohesion and electoral
processes have all been evident since the
reforms were implemented. This is not to say
that these might not turn around at some
stage in the future, or that the institutional
models chosen are necessarily the optimal
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ones for Papua New Guinea. But measurable
improvements have occurred, and in a state
as frequently criticised as Papua New Guinea
such outcomes should be acknowledged and
applauded.
Despite this, some academic critics
continue to assert that these significant
achievements are, in fact, a failure. Such
interpretations should not go unchallenged.
Facile comparisons of Papua New Guinea
with countries such as Fiji, or exaggerated
claims of what institutional reforms purport
to achieve, obscure more than they reveal. By
the same token, enthusiasts for reform need
to be honest about its limitations and the
kinds of changes that political engineering
can effect. For instance, while the OLIPPAC
has helped stabilise government and
introduced some much-needed incentives for
party system development, it has not altered
fundamentally established political practice.
Similarly, despite the positive results so far,
it is too early to say if the electoral reforms
will prove to be administratively manageable
at next year’s national elections. In the
meantime, however, we can give two cheers
for political reform in Papua New Guinea.
Note
1 ‘Organic laws’ have the status of
constitutional law, and were introduced in
Papua New Guinea in order to keep the
Constitution focused on basic principles and
institutions. Despite this, the PNG
Constitution is one of the longest in the world.
References
Baker, L., 2005. ‘Political integrity in Papua
New Guinea and the search for
stability’, Pacific Economic Bulletin
20(1):98–115.
Fraenkel, J., 2004. ‘Electoral engineering in
Papua New Guinea: lessons from Fiji
and elsewhere’, Pacific Economic Bulletin
19(1):122–33.
Gelu, A., 2005. ‘The failures of the Organic
Law on the integrity of political parties
and candidates (OLIPPAC)’, Pacific
Economic Bulletin, 20(1):83–97.
PNG Electoral Commission, 1997. Report to
the Sixth National Parliament on the 1997
National Election, Government Printer,
Port Moresby.
Reilly, B., 1996. ‘The effects of the electoral
system in Papua New Guinea’, in Y.
Saffu (ed.), The 1992 PNG Election:
change and continuity in electoral politics,
Department of Political and Social
Change, Research School of Pacific and
Asian Studies, The Australian National
University, Canberra:46–76.
——, 1999. ‘Party politics in Papua New
Guinea: a deviant case?’, Pacific Affairs,
72:225–46.
——, 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies:
electoral engineering for conflict
management, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
——, forthcoming. Democracy and Diversity:
political engineering in the Asia-Pacific,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sepoe, O., 2004. Challenges of
strengthening the political party system
in Papua New Guinea, paper presented
at the Political Culture, Representation
and Electoral Systems in the Pacific
Conference, Port Vila, 10–12 July.
Standish, B., 2005. Limited Preferential
Voting: some early lessons, paper
presented at conference on Overcoming
Constraints in Papua New Guinea,
Lowy Institute for International Policy,
Sydney, 18 January.
Taylor, M. and Herman, V.M., 1971. ‘Party
systems and government stability’,
American Political Science Review,
65(1):28–37.
